Demographic change is driving internal conflict within loyalist paramilitary groups – we must pay close attention or risk misunderstanding the security challenge these groups continue to pose.
Two weeks ago I was home in Belfast on a research visit and to launch my latest book, Enemies Within, an exploration of the paramilitary leadership of Johnny ‘Mad Dog’ Adair.
It was quite an eventful trip, not only because of the buzz surrounding my new book but also because I wanted to get the inside track on something I have been turning over in my mind ever since finishing Enemies Within.
In the book I chart the rise and fall of Adair, a paramilitary leader who exploited the inner contradictions within the ranks of the UDA/UFF in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s to seize and maintain control of the group in west Belfast.
I outline for the reader what I regard as the three principal types of UDA member – referring to them variously as ‘vigilantes’, ‘mercenaries’ and ‘extremists’.
I see Adair very much in the latter category. He was ideologically motivated and committed to pursuing a violent campaign against Irish republicanism, even if a lot of Catholic civilians were killed and injured in the process.
Although my timeline ends with Adair’s release from prison and move into exile in Great Britain in January 2005, I was keen to evaluate where those variants of ‘UDA DNA’ sit today. Utilising my network of contacts, I engaged the current leadership of the organisation right across Northern Ireland.
As a result I gained a unique glimpse into the shifting sands within paramilitary groups that you rarely see reflected in much of the commentary and analysis on them today.
For most occasional commentators paramilitary groups exist in a kind of freeze-frame image from the 1990s.
The reality is that the security context in which they operate has been radically transformed over the past 30 years.
As a consequence these groups have had to adapt to the changing circumstances.
Another internal factor driving this change – and something rarely reported on – is the ticking time bomb of demographics.
What I want to explore in this blog post is how the age profiles within loyalist paramilitary groups is driving internal fluctuations, which may have far-reaching consequences for peace and stability now and in the future.
One reason why it is important to consider such deep-rooted factors is because we now find ourselves on the eve of the submission of a report by the Independent Expert, Fleur Ravensbergen, who was appointed to conduct a ‘short scoping and engagement exercise to assess whether there is merit in, and support for, a formal process of engagement to bring about paramilitary group transition to disbandment.’
Understanding how internal factors like demographic change animates or frustrates decision-making in these groups will be crucial to whether we see them leave the stage.
A quick note on Drumcree
With the Drumcree dispute back in the news headlines it is tempting, as some republicans have done so already, to raise the spectre of paramilitary involvement.
However, we must also acknowledge the statement issued by the Loyalist Communities Council (LCC) in early September that its members do not support the threat of violence over the dispute.
So far it appears they are keeping their word.
I find the relative restraint emanating from within paramilitary groups interesting, especially given their chequered history of involvement in parading disputes.
Some of those who were active in loyalism in the 1990s have helpfully reminded me that this is deliberate. The UVF leadership on the Shankill, to take one example, actually opposed the Drumcree dispute to such an extent they stood down Billy Wright and the Mid Ulster UVF over the issue. They also murdered and threatened other loyalists who became involved in the matter.
I am not suggesting we completely ignore the possibility of a degree of paramilitary influence on this issue or, indeed, others.
As I made clear in an earlier evaluation of the race-based violence in June, we need to draw degrees of distinction between influence and involvement.
What I want to do here is something different – I want to step back from a single, albeit highly emotive, issue and look at broader factors at play inside paramilitary groupings.
Avoiding Conventional Wisdom – The Three Scenarios
The real challenge is to avoid the gravitational pull of conventional wisdom.
Events over the past week have reinforced my thinking that single issues tend to consume our bandwidth to such an extent that we do not see the wheels of deeper processes turning.
This may explain the real reason why loyalist paramilitaries have been quiet on the Drumcree issue.
Another reason, one that I find even more intriguing, is the inner turmoil we have seen within loyalist paramilitary groups over the past few months.
During my trip to Belfast I briefed the Independent Reporting Commission (IRC) on my assessment of where I believe loyalist paramilitaries are in relation to so-called ‘group transition’.
I tried to remain upbeat and, therefore, gave the Commissioners three likely scenarios I see unfolding in the context of the Ravensbergen scoping exercise.
The first is that loyalist groups are going nowhere, despite their adoption of the language of ‘group transition’.
The second is there is every indication of the groups finally leaving the stage but they need something more to enable this transition, perhaps money or an internationally recognised figure to hold their hand.
The third scenario, which is perhaps most likely, is they are not going anywhere because the middle managers within the UVF and UDA do not want them to go anywhere – there are just too many multilayered interests these days to enable them to leave the stage.
It has been my understanding for some time that the senior leaderships of these groups are not being told the truth by those further down the chain of command.
Significantly, one of the key issues in recent months is connected to the racial tensions and serious public disorder we witnessed in June. This has led to what I would call ‘internal fluctuations’.
What I now understand to be the case – at least in one of the two main loyalist groupings – is that a certain older generation of leader has been stood down and put out to pasture.
Younger elements have moved to consolidate a more hardline organisation in their own image.
Taking the Long View
This is not something new to loyalism. Let me be clear, I have written about it in two books now, UVF: Behind the Mask (2017) and Enemies Within (2026).
Younger paramilitaries have always defied and challenged older leaders.
What makes it different this time is that the centralised authority of these groups has greatly diminished.
I have characterised this in terms of creaking paramilitary structures.
Another metaphor might be to think of an old rusting ship, what maritime salvagers call a ‘halk’, still technically afloat but stripped of its fittings and fixtures and incapable of setting sail for the open ocean.
Aboard are the wise old sea dogs, the Old Guard, who are growing weaker, ever more grey haired, slower and ineffective in decision-making. Once revered sailors but now relics of a long dead storied past at sea. They refuse to abandon ship and instead cling onto the helm while the halk thrashes against its involuntary moorings.
And beneath the decks, the landlubbers and cabin boys who have been brought up on a steady diet of tales of derring-do. They are either trapped aboard the doomed vessel or wish to refurbish the dilapidated haul and set sail for new horizons.
This is basically what we have in human networked form inside paramilitary groups today, especially since these organisations have never turned off the tap of recruitment in all these years of relative peace.
If you forgive my metaphorical flurry, my broader point is we are heading into uncharted territory and it’s reducible in part to demographics.
Sooner or later the Young Turks will rise up and throw the Old Guard overboard.
I believe we are now seeing this being played out in the broader hinterland of paramilitary loyalism.
And it will only get worse as single issues – like immigration or parading disputes – go unresolved and expose the unfinished business of the peace process.
Seeing the Bigger Picture
For serious analysts of the security situation I want to propose what some academics call a thought experiment.
Imagine for a moment you are an analyst in the PSNI’s ‘C3’ branch (intelligence department) charged with collecting, collating and processing intelligence on, say, the UDA.
You might set out by wanting to understand the thinking of the group’s leadership but you are quickly confronted with the reality that it is a fairly loose coalition of interests spread over several geographic areas. You assume that even though they are balkanised they are still hierarchical. Your thinking immediately goes to the top men in those areas – who are they? What are they thinking? How do they go about running their respective groups? And, crucially, what are their plans are in terms of group transition?
Now, imagine for a moment you want to move beyond merely looking over their shoulder. You want to start to understand how their decision-making impacts on the organisation they preside over.
What happens if those paramilitary leaders are suddenly challenged on the basis of their decisions on, say, race and immigration, rather than something like Drumcree? How might they receive this? Would they push back or back down? As an old source of mine once reminded me, “these are paramilitary groups not the Boys Brigade”. Under normal circumstances the stronger Alpha male would likely dominate the group and the more Beta elements would be forced back into line. But what happens when the Alpha males are a lot older and, like the old sea dogs on the rusting hulk, become weaker? What if several areas came together and pushed back against the hierarchical structures more deliberately?
Thought experiments rely on a series of “what if?” questions being asked to challenge assumptions produced by conventional wisdom.
They can also help us think through in a structured manner how conflict between Young Turks and an Old Guard is likely to play out.
Significantly they can also aid us in making sense of the consequences of internal fluctuations, which might lead us back to the point of my thought experiment: what does this mean for our understanding of loyalist paramilitary structures going forward?
I think, ultimately, we have to be prepared to change our assessment of paramilitary groups – their objectives, strategy, tactics and purpose – when the internal dynamics change.
My own thoughts, merely based on intuition and a fair degree of insight into the historical record, is that old modes of thinking can very quickly deflect us from truly understanding those things that change and those other things that stay the same.
We must guard against this.
For the reasons outlined above, the times they are a chang’in.
Our analysis of the situation must change with them.
You can buy my new book, Enemies Within, via the Merrion Press website or via Amazon.